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PROMOTING SELF-SUFFICIENCY? HOW HRA’S
EXCLUSION OF INCARCERATION FROM THE
DEFINITION OF “TEMPORARY ABSENCE”
CONTRADICTS STATUTORY MANDATES AND
HURTS NEW YORK FAMILIES
Matthew P. Main†
ABSTRACT
The New York City Human Resources Administration has im-
plemented a policy that has a punitive and disproportionate im-
pact on poor families of color. The policy departs from the
legislative mandate to support New York’s neediest and most at risk
by arbitrarily excluding incarceration from the definition of “tem-
porary absence,” as it applies to the Cash Assistance program. Aside
from the discriminatory impact on poor children and families, the
policy decision comes at a higher cost to New York taxpayers in the
midst of a financial crisis. This Comment evaluates the legal flaws
in the policy, the persons it targets, the families it affects, and how
it must be remedied in order to truly promote self-sufficiency and
survival for New Yorkers in need.
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INTRODUCTION
The New York City Human Resources Administration
(“HRA”) has a policy that could hurt thousands of New York’s most
vulnerable children and families. More troubling is that during the
biggest financial crisis in decades, HRA has chosen a path that will
actually increase costs to the City and add to the burden on New
York taxpayers.1 Perhaps even more surprising is that the policy has
been adopted despite its patent departure from HRA’s own stated
mission2 and in contravention to the agency’s statutory mandate.3
The policy affects recipients of Cash Assistance from HRA—a pop-
ulation comprised of New York’s poorest and neediest families
1 See discussion infra Part III.
2 The HRA website states that its mission is to “provide[ ] temporary help to indi-
viduals and families with social service and economic needs to assist them in reaching
self-sufficiency.” About HRA/DDS, N.Y.C. HUMAN RES. ADMIN., DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS.,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hra/html/about/about_hra_dss.shtml (last visited Nov.
15, 2010); see also CITY OF N.Y. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT REPORT
ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PAPERLESS OFFICE SYSTEM BY THE
HUMAN RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION (2010) (“HRA’s mission is to enhance the quality
of life for all City residents by providing temporary assistance to eligible individuals
and families to help them lead independent and productive lives.”).
3 According to the enabling legislation, the statutory duty of social services offi-
cials is to “provide adequately for those unable to maintain themselves” and to “re-
store such persons to a condition of self-support or self-care.” N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW
§ 131(1) (McKinney 2003).
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and, notably, one comprised primarily of poor women and chil-
dren of color.4
The purpose of this Comment is to provide an overview of
HRA’s Cash Assistance program and the devastating practical ef-
fects that HRA’s decision to adopt a discriminatory, arbitrary, and
contradictory definition of “temporary absence” will have on at-risk
children and families. The first section will outline and explain the
connection between Cash Assistance and the temporary absence
policy. The discussion will continue in the second section to discuss
the populations—families, children, and incarcerated persons—
who are affected by the HRA policy. The third section of the Com-
ment will use relevant data to contextualize the discussion and to
provide a concrete illustration of the disproportionate impact the
policy will potentially have on poor people of color. By means of
analogy to other programs and other jurisdictions, the fourth sec-
tion will demonstrate the ease and feasibility of adopting a more
just and efficacious policy. The final section will offer a remedy—
that incarceration be included within the definition of temporary
4 The author notes that the phrase “people of color” is used throughout the
course of this Comment in a manner that is concededly overbroad. While some statis-
tics relied on refer to “blacks and Latinos” or “African Americans and Hispanics” or
even more generally “people of color,” the author has made the conscious decision to
generalize these statistics in some places throughout the article by adopting the
phrase “people of color.” The word choice is deliberate and is intended to acknowl-
edge the plight of all persons who identify themselves as members of minority popula-
tions whether in race, nationality, ethnicity, or religion. The author’s choice of
language is not in any way intended to minimize the particular struggles of any of
these diverse groups of oppressed people. As of January 2010, females represented
83% of Family Assistance recipients, 46% of Safety Net recipients and 87% of Tempo-
rary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”) recipients who have been converted to
Safety Net Assistance. Blacks and Hispanics represent 92% of Family Assistance recipi-
ents, 80% of Safety Net recipients, and 95% of TANF recipients who have been con-
verted to Safety Net Assistance. N.Y.C Human Res. Admin., Dep’t of Soc. Servs., HRA
Facts Quarterly Supplement January 2010 (2010), http://www.nyc.gov/html/hra/
downloads/pdf/hrafacts_2010_01.pdf [hereinafter HRA Facts Quarterly]. Histori-
cally, national data have shown that single-mother families are those most in need of
TANF and food stamps. For a discussion of the history of race, gender, and public
assistance and the evolution of the welfare system as a “tool of law enforcement,” see
Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 643,
648–61 (2009). Gustafson also discusses the punitive system of welfare that has devel-
oped along with the “reform.”
A vast regulatory and punitive system developed under welfare re-
form. The welfare policies the states instituted after welfare devolution
included a broad range of punitive approaches to the poor designed
not only to punish poor adults who failed to transition from welfare to
work, but also to punish entire families where the head of the house-
hold failed to live up to governing standards of morality.
Id. at 666.
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absence—as the necessary solution to ensure that HRA’s stated
goal “to promote the maximum level of self-sufficiency” is truly be-
ing realized.5
I. CASH ASSISTANCE AND TEMPORARY ABSENCE: WHAT THEY ARE
AND HOW THEY WORK
The safety net provided by social welfare programs exists be-
cause the American people demanded it.6 Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, in explaining to Congress the objectives of the programs
created under the New Deal, made clear that such programs are a
matter-of-fact entitlement created by the U.S. Constitution. “If, as
our Constitution tells us, our Federal Government was established
among other things ‘to promote the general welfare,’ it is our plain
duty to provide for that security upon which welfare depends.”7
Welfare programs developed to ensure that a civilized society will
promote and protect human dignity for everyone by providing a
basic foundation that permits people to be self-sufficient.8 In New
York City and around the State, especially during such challenging
economic times, many families rely on programs such as Cash As-
sistance (“CA”),9 Medical Assistance10 and Food Stamps11 in order
5 See Family Independence Administration, N.Y.C. HUMAN RES. ADMIN., DEP’T OF SOC.
SERVS., http://www.nyc.gov/html/hra/html/programs/fia.shtml (last visited Nov. 17,
2010); N.Y. SOC. SERVS. LAW § 131(1) (McKinney 2003); see also About TANF, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, OFFICE OF FAM.
ASSISTANCE, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/tanf/about.html (last updated
Nov. 20, 2008) (stating that the mission of the federal TANF program is “to help
needy families achieve self-sufficiency”).
6 FRANCIS FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 451 (Vintage
Books 1993).
7 Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, Message to Congress on
the Objectives and Accomplishments of the Administration (June 8, 1934). See U.S.
CONST. pmbl.
8 See TAMMY DRAUT, NEW OPPORTUNITIES? PUBLIC OPINION ON POVERTY, INCOME
INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY: 1996–2001, 6–8 (Demos: A Network for Ideas and
Action) (2001) (explaining the common public opinion that people are entitled to be
economically self-sufficient and that it is the responsibility of the government to en-
sure that basic human needs are met).
9 The Cash Assistance program provides low-income families with temporary ben-
efits including shelter assistance, energy assistance, and cash grants to help them sur-
vive the difficult economic situation they are experiencing. Temporary Cash Assistance,
N.Y.C. HUMAN RES. ADMIN., DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS. http://www.nyc.gov/html/hra/
html/directory/cash.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2010). Cash Assistance is funded by
the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program for up to 60 months; see
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–619 (2006). Upon expiration of the 60-month
period, the funds are provided under the New York State Safety Net program. See N.Y.
SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 158–159 (McKinney 2003).
10 N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., Medical Assistance Program, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/hra/html/programs/medical_assistance_program.shtml (explaining the medi-
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to meet their basic survival needs. HRA’s temporary absence policy
is one key example of how the government is failing to meet the
constitutionally mandated duty to promote the general welfare. As
of January 2010, there were over 155,000 families (355,454 individ-
uals) receiving Cash Assistance—which provides funds to help pay
rent, fuel, and utility expenses—from the Department of Social
Services of the Human Resources Administration for the City of
New York.12 Consistent with statutory and regulatory mandate, the
HRA website proclaims that one of the primary goals of programs
that provide CA funds is to provide economic stability for families
so that they can work “to promote the maximum level of self-suffi-
ciency.”13 Unfortunately, it is precisely this economic stability that
is threatened by HRA’s current policy regarding treatment of tem-
porarily incarcerated individuals. In reality, as will be shown, the
policy is structured to function in a manner that directly contra-
venes the stated goal of maximizing self-sufficiency.14
Families receiving CA, by definition, already struggle to meet
their daily needs of food and shelter as they walk the difficult path
to self-sufficiency.15 If a member of the household is incarcerated,
even for a brief period, the entire family is destabilized and faces
significant risks of job loss and eviction.16 In fact, when a house-
hold member is incarcerated, families are two times more likely to
move to another residence or shelter during the month that the
incarceration occurs.17 For these families, it is critical that certain
forms of CA remain available to stabilize them during this crisis
and, particularly, to “retain housing and maintain the home.”18
cal services that are made available to low-income New Yorkers under the Medical
Assistance Program).
11 N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., Food Stamps & Food Programs, http://www.nyc.
gov/html/hra/html/directory/food.shtml (explaining the process for low-income
New Yorkers to obtain assistance to “increase their ability to purchase food”).
12 N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., Office of Data Reporting and Analysis, HRA Facts:
January 2010 (2010), http://www.nyc.gov/html/hra/downloads/pdf/hrafacts_2010_
01.pdf.
13 N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., supra note 5; see N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131(1) (Mc-
Kinney 2003); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 5.
14 See N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., supra note 5.
15 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
16 See discussion infra Part II.A.
17 Zaire D. Flores, Jeffrey Lin, John Markovic & Nancy Smith, Understanding Family
Homelessness in New York City 29 (2005), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dhs/downloads/
pdf/vera_Study.pdf.
18 Under the policy directives issued by HRA, “An allowance for household ex-
penses for up to 180 days [is permissible] if essential to retain housing and maintain
the home.” (Policy Directive No. 08-16-ELI, N.Y.C. HUMAN RES. ADMIN. (Apr. 16,
2008) [hereinafter PD No. 08-16-ELI]; Policy Directive No. 02-35-ELI, N.Y.C. HUMAN
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HRA’s temporary absence policy was created to provide exactly this
type of security and continuity of family stability.19
A. “Temporary Absence” and the Exclusion of Incarceration
In order to further advance this objective of stability, the New
York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (“OTDA”)
promulgated regulations that promote the uninterrupted provi-
sion of Cash Assistance by not penalizing recipients for “temporary
absences” during the period in which they are receiving benefits.20
This so-called “temporary absence” policy permits families to con-
tinue receiving Cash Assistance to pay rent and utilities when a
household member is found to be temporarily absent “because of
illness or other good cause.”21 According to the final rule, codified
at § 349.4 of the Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations
of the State of New York (“NYCRR”), a temporary absence is “any
absence . . . during which the applicant or recipient (i) does not
leave the United States; (ii) does not evidence intent to establish
residence elsewhere; and (iii) complies with [§ 349.4] and other
provisions of [Title 18 of the NYCRR].”22 The temporarily-absent
household member is simply budgeted into the calculation of CA
benefits as if he were physically present in the household during
RES. ADMIN. (Aug. 30, 2002) [hereinafter PD No. 02-35-ELI]). Even when persons are
absent from the household because they are temporarily housed in a residential treat-
ment center, they are included under the temporary absence policy. PD No. 08-16-
ELI. Likewise, when children are temporarily removed from the household and
placed in foster care, the temporary absence policy provides the family with “contin-
ued shelter and fuel allowance.” Id. In Matter of Chrystol B., the court explained why it
was so important for HRA to provide continued cash assistance even though a child
was temporarily absent from the household. It said that
[a] primary responsibility of the Commissioner is “to preserve and stabi-
lize family life wherever possibility [sic].” Obviously, the reduction of
the shelter allowance not only negates the supportive services provided
by the Department of Social Services but may very likely lead to the
break-up of the family household.
In re Chrystol B., 429 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980).
19 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4 (2007). According to the legisla-
tive history, as per the notice of adoption of the rule, the purpose of establishing a
broad definition of “temporary absence” was “[t]o make it easier for social services
districts to determine [that] public assistance recipients, who are temporarily absent
from the district of residence, continue to be eligible for assistance.” 27 N.Y. Reg. 18
(Mar. 23, 2005); accord N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131(3) (McKinney’s 2003) (stating that
a purpose of providing social services is to “maintain and strengthen family life”).
20 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4.
21 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.  tit. 18, § 349.4(a)(2)(i).
22 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.  tit. 18, § 349.4(a) (emphasis added); see also PD
No. 02-35-ELI; PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18 (“Temporarily absent individuals are
budgeted as if they are physically in the household and are eligible for the basic allow-
ance plus energy, shelter, fuel, and any other additional allowances.”).
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the period of absence, and the family’s budget is not disrupted.23
However, a recent HRA policy directive created significant—
and improper—limits on the broad definition outlined by the state
regulation.24 The directive expressly excludes incarceration from
the definition and thereby prevents those who are temporarily in-
carcerated from continuing to receive CA due to their “temporary
absence.”25 As a result, families must confront the reality of a re-
duction or revocation of benefits when a household member is de-
tained or imprisoned, even if for a brief period of time.26 The
exclusion of incarceration under this policy directive remains the
practice at HRA despite clear statutory and regulatory language as
well as pertinent case law that consistently recognize incarceration
as “good cause” to justify absences.27
This policy fails to consider the factual reality that most peri-
ods of incarceration are very brief.28 In 2008, for example, the me-
dian stay for all inmates at New York City’s jail at Rikers Island was
just 7.74 days.29 The exclusion of persons who fall into this narrow
exception crafted by HRA does not serve the broader purpose un-
derlying the temporary absence policy as it applies to CA and other
social programs at HRA.30 In light of the documented brevity of
most periods of incarceration, the exclusion does nothing more
than punish those who are at the highest risk of arrest and least
able to make bail—regardless of whether such persons are ever
found guilty of a crime.31
23 PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18.
24 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a).
25 Id.
26 See id. (“Individuals incarcerated more than two weeks are not eligible to receive
cash assistance.”).
27 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a); infra Part I.C.
28 For a more complete analysis of typical incarceration periods and other circum-
stances surrounding arrest and incarceration in New York see discussion infra Part
III.A.
29 N.Y.C. Indep. Budget Office, City Spending Rises on Programs to Help Inmates Leav-
ing Jail 2 (2009), http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/dischargeplanning060309.pdf.
30 See N.Y.C. HUMAN RES. ADMIN., supra note 5; N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131(1) (Mc-
Kinney 2003); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 5.
31 See discussion infra Part III.B. See also Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a
Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2008) (discussing the cycle of poverty and the multitude of factors
that weigh into a defendant’s decision to plead guilty, especially the inability to post
bail):
[T]he dysfunctional families, the segregated housing communities,
inadequate foster care, poor schools, lack of jobs, inadequate family
courts, drug dependencies, mental problems, cruel imprisonments, ex-
clusion from voting, repeated crime, and early death. Peer pressures to
fail from within the deprived, segregated community are especially hard
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To promote family stability and cohesiveness—and to comply
with the statutory mandate of § 131 of the New York Social Services
Law to provide assistance to needy New Yorkers32—HRA and
OTDA established the temporary absence policy to allow for Cash
Assistance benefits to continue even if a recipient is temporarily
absent “because of illness or other good cause.”33 The policy cre-
ates a standard of flexibility in the continued disbursement of Cash
Assistance when a household member is unable to attend the re-
quired meetings, work assignments, or recertification appoint-
ments due to his or her temporary absence.34 Fundamentally, the
temporary absence policy provides security and support to ensure
that temporary circumstances do not derail essential stability.35
Without the protection of such a policy, a single household mem-
ber’s reduction in benefits could have detrimental effects on the
entire family.36
Benefit reductions due to this restrictive interpretation di-
to overcome. These are the cases we see repeatedly when we sentence.
To help break this chain of events, the Bronx Defenders has recently
instituted a program which provides indigent persons arrested for non-
violent crimes with bail money. This program hopes to combat the phe-
nomenon of those who cannot afford to post bail pleading guilty to
“crimes they did not commit in the greater interest of leaving Rikers
Island, often to tend their children.”
Id. (internal citation omitted).
32 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131. Section 131 of the New York Social Services Law
provides that it is the “duty of social services officials . . . to provide adequately for
those unable to maintain themselves” in an effort to restore such persons to a “condi-
tion of self-support or self-care.” § 131(1). The statute further provides that social
services officials are charged to help those who are discharged from “mental hygiene
institutions in their transition to a condition of self-support and self-care in the com-
munity.” § 131(2). The mandate of such services under the statute is that they be
provided in order to “maintain and strengthen family life.” § 131(3).
33 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a)(2)(i) (2007).
34 The HRA temporary absence policy permits CA recipients to temporarily miss
work training programs and appointments that are otherwise required for the contin-
ued receipt of CA benefits. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131(7)(b) (2011) (explaining
that persons who are employable but who willfully refuse or fail to report for or coop-
erate in a work training program will be ineligible for Cash Assistance).
35 See, e.g., In re Chrystol B., 429 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980) (stating
that it is “a primary responsibility” of the Department of Social Services to “preserve
and stabilize family life whenever possibility [sic]”).
36 See id. (“Obviously, the reduction of the shelter allowance not only negates the
supportive services provided by the Department of Social Services but may very likely
lead to the break-up of the family household.”); New York State Office of Temporary
and Disability Assistance, Temporary Assistance Source Book 31 (2010) [hereinafter Tem-
porary Assistance Source Book], http://otda.ny.gov/main/programs/temporary-assis-
tance/TASB.pdf (“Local districts must delete individuals who move out of the
assistance household as soon as possible after discovering the change in household
composition.”).
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rectly contradict the purpose of social services programs to achieve
the “maximum level of self-sufficiency” and leave families vulnera-
ble to abrupt situations of crisis and insecurity.37 It is a fundamen-
tal tenet to statutory interpretation that “remedial statutes”—like
those underlying HRA’s mandate to provide social services to
needy New Yorkers—“are to be liberally construed so as to spread
their beneficial result as widely as possible.”38 HRA’s construction
of temporary absence flies in the face of this widely accepted tenet
by actually restricting the scope of those who will be benefited
under the temporary absence policy.39 It therefore follows that,
consistent with the underlying objectives of stability and family co-
hesiveness, the definition of “temporary absence” should be inter-
preted to include reasonably brief periods of incarceration as
contemplated by the state regulation.40
B. Cash Assistance: The Process and Consequences of Ineligibility
The total amount of Cash Assistance that is distributed to eligi-
ble persons in need is based on the aggregate of three sub-catego-
ries: Basic CA Allowance,41 Home Energy Allowance,42 and
37 See Family Independence Administration, N.Y.C. HUMAN RES. ADMIN., DEP’T OF SO-
CIAL SERVS., http://www.nyc.gov/html/hra/html/programs/fia.shtml; N.Y. SOC.
SERV. LAW § 131(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2006) (stating that the purpose of
TANF is to “(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for
in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy
parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage;
(3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish
annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these
pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent fami-
lies”); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 5.
38 Mlodozeniec v. Worthington Corp., 189 N.Y.S. 468, 471 (App. Div. 1959), aff’d
168 N.E.2d 834 (N.Y. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 628 (1961); see N.Y. STAT. LAW § 321
(McKinney 2007).
39 Cf. People v. Figuera, 894 N.Y.S.2d 724, 739 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (reasoning that
where the plain language of a remedial statute makes explicit exclusions, there is “a
strong inference that no further exclusions were intended . . . [and the statute] must
be liberally construed”).
40 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a) (2007) (outlining the basic
requirements that must be satisfied for an absence to be considered a “temporary
absence” without restricting that definition either expressly or impliedly with respect
to absence due to temporary incarceration).
41 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.2(d); DON FRIEDMAN, CASH ASSIS-
TANCE (Leslie Boutin ed., Center for Benefits and Services) (2008), http://www.cssny.
org/userimages/downloads/PublicAssistance_.pdf; see also CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, Benefit
Tools, http://www.cssny.org/userimages/downloads/Needs%20Based_04_09.pdf.
42 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.5(d); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 41;
CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, supra note 41.
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Maximum Shelter Allowance.43 Grant amounts are calculated and
disbursed to recipients according to the number of persons in the
household.44
In New York, both state regulations and the Temporary Assis-
tance Source Book45 indicate that in order for an individual to be
included in the budget, he or she must be residing in the dwelling
unit.46 However, for the purposes of Cash Assistance, the regula-
tions provide that a CA household may also include “persons who
are temporarily absent from such household, such as children or
minors attending school away from home, whose full needs are not
otherwise met.”47 Specifically, the New York State regulations
clearly establish that a person shall be considered “temporarily ab-
sent” and, thus, remain entitled to his or her benefits, as long as he
or she “(i) does not leave the United States; (ii) does not evidence
intent to establish residence elsewhere; and (iii) complies with
[§ 349.4] and other provisions of [Title 18 of the NYCRR].”48
Under this temporary absence standard, the grant of Cash As-
sistance may be continued as long as the participant is “reasonably
expected” to return to the home and the abovementioned condi-
tions are met.49 The policy includes an inherent safeguard that if
an absence extends beyond six months, the absent person is re-
quired to submit affirmative evidence of his or her continuing in-
tention to return to the home and that he or she is prevented from
returning because of “illness or other good cause.”50 The absent
recipient must also continue to be financially eligible for the grant
in the same or different amount and have continuing contact with
the Agency or another social services agency located outside the
43 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.3(a); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 41;
CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, supra note 41.
44 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131-a(2)(a) (McKinney 2003).
45 The Temporary Assistance Source Book is a comprehensive guide to social ser-
vices law, regulations, directives, and informational letters published by the Office of
Temporary and Disability Assistance and is designed to be a source of authoritative
information for staff providing Temporary Assistance services. Temporary Assistance
Source Book, supra note 36, at 1-1.
46 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.30(a) (2007); Temporary Assistance
Source Book, supra note 36, at 576.
47 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.30(a); Temporary Assistance Source
Book, supra note 36, at 576.
48 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a) (emphasis added); see also PD
No. 02-35-ELI; PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18 (“Temporarily absent individuals are
budgeted as if they are physically in the household and are eligible for the basic allow-
ance plus energy, shelter, fuel and any other additional allowances.”).
49 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a); see PD No. 02-35-ELI and PD
No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18.
50 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.  tit. 18, § 349.4(a)(2)(i).
2010] PROMOTING SELF-SUFFICIENCY? 115
state.51
Even under certain exceptional circumstances, the temporary
absence of the recipient may still allow for the continuance of Shel-
ter and Home Energy Allowances to help pay rent and utility bills.
Examples of such special circumstances include situations where
the temporary absence is due to residential treatment for substance
abuse; where a child is removed from CA and placed in foster care
with a plan for the child to eventually return to the home; or where
an individual is in a medical facility and reasonably expected to
return to the household.52
Under any of these circumstances, allowance for household
expenses can be made for up to 180 days if “essential to retain the
housing and maintain the home.”53 As a means of oversight, such
payments are controlled and cannot continue for more than 45
days unless a caseworker has reviewed the recipient’s status and it is
expected that he or she will not remain in the facility for more
than 180 days.54 Based on these guidelines, the statutory language,
and the abovementioned illustrative situations, there is no indica-
tion that the objectives of Cash Assistance are furthered by exclud-
ing incarceration from the definition of “temporary absence.” In
fact, the same type of oversight could be applied in situations
where a recipient of CA has been temporarily incarcerated. Given
that very short periods of incarceration are the overwhelming
norm, such a practice would be completely consistent with the ex-
ceptions made for persons receiving treatment for substance abuse
or who are temporarily absent due to medical or mental health
reasons.55
Under the current practice, however, if a family member is
temporarily unable to complete work requirements due to a brief
period of incarceration, HRA is permitted to sanction the house-
hold, have its case closed, or have the absence construed as a
“change in household composition,” which would allow HRA to
rebudget the amount of funds that the entire household is entitled
to.56
As a practical matter, this means that an inability to comply
with program mandates due to absence can result in the house-
hold’s monthly allowance being reduced to account for one less
51 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a)(2)(ii), (iii).
52 PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18.
53 PD No. 02-35-ELI and PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18.
54 Id.
55 See PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18.
56 Temporary Assistance Source Book, supra note 36.
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person in the home.57 For families living under the constraints of
already very tight budgets, such a reduction only increases the diffi-
culty of making food, rent, fuel, and utility payments. Unfortu-
nately, due to their indigence alone, families in these situations
may face more drastic consequences like eviction, homelessness, or
even further disruption of the family unit if children are subse-
quently placed in foster care.58 When a household member’s ab-
sence is not recognized within the interpretation of “temporary
absence,” the burden caused by the reduction of CA benefits must
inevitably be borne by the family.
C. An Arbitrary Change of Policy
Until recently, it could be inferred that there was no logical
reason to believe that incarceration would be excluded from the
temporary absence policy.59 In response to the New York State reg-
ulation governing the allocation of Cash Assistance, HRA Policy Di-
rective No. 02-35-ELI (“PD No. 02-35-ELI”), dated August 30, 2002,
was issued to clarify the meaning of “temporarily absent.”60 PD No.
02-35 made it clear that the definition of “temporary absence” in-
cludes circumstances where a Cash Assistance recipient is absent
“due to illness or other reasons.”61 Notably, the policy directive made
no mention of incarceration.62
This interpretation of the controlling state regulations
changed significantly, however, on April 16, 2008, when HRA Pol-
icy Directive No. 08-16-ELI (“PD No. 08-16-ELI”) revised PD No.
02-35-ELI. The language in this new directive was altered to state
that “[a]n individual currently in receipt of Cash Assistance (CA)
who is temporarily absent from the household due to illness or
other good cause and intends to return to the household, is entitled
to a continued CA grant.”63 This revised directive narrowed the
57 Id.
58 See discussion infra Part II.B.
59 Neither the enabling statute, § 131 of the New York Social Service Law nor the
governing state regulation, § 349.4 of the NYCRR, nor even the first policy directive
issued by HRA suggests that incarceration would be excluded from the definition of
temporary absence. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131 (McKinney 2003); N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a) (2007); PD No. 02-35-ELI supra note 18.
60 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4.
61 PD No. 02-35-ELI, supra note 18 (emphasis added).
62 See id.
63 PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18 (emphasis added). In pertinent part, the direc-
tive states:
An individual currently in receipt of Cash Assistance (CA) who is
temporarily absent from the household due to illness or other good
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scope of the definition of “temporary absence” by modifying its lan-
guage from “illness or other reasons” to “illness or other good
cause.”64 Most significant, and in contradiction with the broad
OTDA definition, the directive mandated that anyone who is ab-
sent for more than two weeks due to incarceration be deemed inel-
igible for Cash Assistance.65
Despite the undisputed temporary nature of most periods of
incarceration,66 the fact that temporarily incarcerated individuals
do not generally intend to establish residence anywhere other than
their residence prior to their incarceration,67 and that most tempo-
rarily incarcerated individuals have yet to be convicted of any
crime,68 HRA has improperly interpreted “temporary absence” to
exclude incarceration.69 Furthermore, HRA has taken a novel ap-
proach, which excludes incarceration from the definition of “good
cause.”70
cause and intends to return to the household, is entitled to a continued
CA grant.
This policy does not apply to individuals who are temporarily ab-
sent due to incarceration. Individuals incarcerated more than two weeks




66 The New York City Department of Correction reports that the average stay for
all detainees at New York City’s jail at Rikers Island is 50.3 days and that 92% of all
admissions are released within 180 days. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Correction, DOC Statis-
tics, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doc/html/stats/doc_stats.shtml (last visited Novem-
ber 15, 2010). The median stay of all inmates at Rikers Island in 2008 was just 7.74
days. N.Y.C. Indep. Budget Office, supra note 29.
67 It is particularly noteworthy that the language defining temporary absence in
PD No. 08-16-ELI departs from the language codified in § 349.4(a) of the NYCRR.
Compare N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a) (2007) with PD No. 08-16-ELI,
supra note 18. The policy directive alters the second requirement to satisfy temporary
absence. In § 349.4(a) the regulation states that the person claiming temporary ab-
sence must “not evidence intent to establish residence elsewhere.” N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a) (2007). However, in PD No. 08-16-ELI, HRA modified
the language, requiring that the person “[e]stablish[ ] the intent to return to the house-
hold.” PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18 (emphasis added). The language in § 349.4(a)
implies that a person’s previous residence remains his continued residence as long as
he evinces no intent to establish residence elsewhere. In contrast, the language of PD
No. 08-16-ELI departs from the regulatory language and imposes an additional bur-
den on the person who is temporarily absent to affirmatively demonstrate an intent to
return to that previous residence.
68 Jennifer R. Wynn, Can Zero Tolerance Last?, in ZERO TOLERANCE 120 (Tanya
Erzen & Andrea McArdle eds., 2001) (“Two-thirds of Rikers detainees are people who
have been arrested for a crime but not yet convicted. They are in jail mainly because
they cannot make bail.”).
69 PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18.
70 Cf., e.g., In re Appeal of C.M., F.H. No. 4286162Z (Office of Temp. and Disability
Assistance Feb. 23, 2005) (fair hearing) (holding that incarceration constitutes good
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Since many of a person’s needs—temporary shelter and three
meals daily—are met while in prison or jail, HRA contends that
there is no apparent basis for the incarcerated person to be consid-
ered temporarily absent in a manner that would permit continued
disbursements of Cash Assistance.71 This rationale, however, ig-
nores the demonstrated impact on families that results from ex-
cluding incarcerated individuals from the temporary absence
policy and also abandons the needs of that person upon his or her
imminent and intended return to the household.72 This exclusion
can result in a loss of crucial financial assistance that is relied on by
the families of incarcerated individuals. Due to the precarious na-
ture of the financial situations experienced by many Cash Assis-
tance families and the important need for stability to promote self-
sufficiency, incarceration should be evaluated by HRA no differ-
ently than any other temporary absence situation.
D. Including Incarceration in the Definition of “Temporary Absence”
Would Impose No Additional Costs or Burdens on HRA
If, as required by the state regulation, the circumstances sur-
rounding incarceration were evaluated in a manner similar to
other temporary absence situations, no changes to current HRA
processes for determining the continued disbursement of CA
funds would be required.73 HRA would continue to supervise dis-
cause); In re Appeal of [Appellant], F.H. No. 3307248R (Office of Temp. and Disabil-
ity Assistance Mar. 29, 2000) (fair hearing) (holding that incarceration constitutes
good cause).
71 Memorandum from Bill Faulkner, N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., to James Whe-
lan, Deputy Comm’r, N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin. (June 16, 2003); see S. REP. NO. 96-
987 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4787, 4794–95 (justifying the termination
of benefits to incarcerated persons on the grounds that the expenses for shelter, food,
clothing and medical care are provided by prison officials); cf. Zipkin v. Heckler, 790
F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that § 402(x) of the Social Security Act, which
suspends Social Security benefits to persons incarcerated as felons, “rationally reflects
the policy that prisoners’ Social Security retirement benefit payments be suspended
since their substantial economic needs are already met”).
72 See discussion infra Part II.
73 The legislative history does not suggest that incarceration was intended to be
excluded from the definition of temporary absence. See 26 N.Y. Reg. 15 (Apr. 28,
2004). Thus, it should be presumed to have been contemplated because a person who
is incarcerated can satisfy the requirements of § 349.4(a) of the NYCRR. See N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a) (2007). The legislative history evinces a
clear expectation that the temporary absence policy would lessen, rather than in-
crease, the burden on social services agencies. 26 N.Y. Reg. 15 (Apr. 28, 2004). In the
notice of proposed rulemaking, OTDA stated that it expected the temporary absence
policy to reduce errors and “save money on administrative costs” by reducing the time
required of social services workers to make assistance determinations and the confu-
sion that resulted from making such determinations. Id. Furthermore, it noted that
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bursement while ensuring that the Cash Assistance and “temporary
absence” eligibility criteria continue to be met.74 It is true that the
temporarily absent recipient may have to be excused from appoint-
ments and work assignments during this interim period, but such
exceptions fall squarely within established “good cause” definitions
and are made routinely by HRA to account for other circumstances
faced by recipients.75
For example, as of April 18, 2010, of the 175,597 persons re-
ceiving CA, 88,050 were excused from work assignments and con-
tinued to receive benefits.76 These data indicate that over 50% of
recipients are already receiving temporary waivers of their work as-
signments.77 Where this is the reality of the current practice, a pol-
icy that extends a similar waiver to individuals for brief periods of
incarceration would be neither inconsistent nor illogical. Families
rely on the stability promoted by such waivers, and the interest of
those families must outweigh any concern generated by an already
routine practice that temporarily excuses work assignments for
those who are temporarily unable to comply.78
According to HRA’s current interpretation of the regulations
governing Cash Assistance, incarcerated individuals are not enti-
tled to any benefits under the definition of “temporary absence.”79
This means that when a family member is temporarily incarcer-
ated, not only are Food Stamps reduced, but Cash Assistance—nec-
essary for rent and utilities—is as well. Although the City and the
State have informally suggested that individuals may be incarcer-
ated for up to 30 days without affecting the continuance of their
“[n]o new professional services” would be required to comply with the new rule and
that the “proposed regulations will not result in any compliance costs for social ser-
vices districts but should result in unspecified savings . . . .” Id.
74 Cf. PD No. 02-35-ELI and PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18 (explaining that con-
tinued disbursement of CA is permissible for up to 180 days as long as the absence is
temporary and the person intends to return to the household).
75 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131(7)(b) (McKinney 2003) (explaining that persons
who are employable but who willfully refuse or fail to report for or cooperate in a
work training program will be ineligible for Cash Assistance); N.Y.C. HUMAN RES.
ADMIN., CA – APRIL 18, 2010 – WEEKLY REPORT, REPORT NO. WJS02. For the most
recent statistics, http://www.nyc.gov/html/hra/downloads/pdf/citywide.pdf (indi-
cating that over 50% of those receiving Cash Assistance as of April 2010 were excused
from mandatory work assignments and continued to receive benefits).
76 N.Y.C. HUMAN RES. ADMIN., supra note 75, at lines 3, 15.
77 Id.
78 Accord N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131(1) (McKinney 2007) (stating that it is the duty
of social services officials to “provide adequately for those unable to maintain them-
selves” and to “restore such persons to a condition of self-support or self-care”).
79 PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18.
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benefits,80 there remains a requirement that families immediately
notify HRA upon any change in household composition,81 which,
under the current interpretation, would include a temporarily in-
carcerated person.82 Such a requirement is particularly problem-
atic because, for many families, a situation where a member of the
household is temporarily incarcerated is not interpreted as a
“change” in household composition, but rather as a family crisis.83
Recipients do have a right to a fair hearing84 where they can
“challenge [the correctness of] certain determinations or ac-
tions”85 of HRA and where it is the burden of HRA to establish that
any discontinuance or reduction was correct.86 However, failure to
make such a challenge can result in an abrupt reduction in bene-
fits because once HRA has been informed that a member of the
household has been incarcerated, it need only provide “timely no-
tice” of the proposed reduction of benefits.87 The “timely notice”
standard requires that HRA inform families of their proposed ac-
tion a mere 10 days prior to the effective date of any reduction or
80 E-mail from James Whelan, Deputy Comm’r, N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., to
Michelle Light (Sep. 9, 2008, 16:05:53 EST) (on file with author).
81 Temporary Assistance Source Book, supra note 36, at 415; N.Y. State, What You
Should Know About Your Rights and Responsibilities (When Applying for or Receiving Benefits)
22 (Feb. 2007), http://www.otda.state.ny.us/main/programs/applications/4148A.pdf. See
also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 387.17(e)(1)(ii) (2007).
82 PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18.
83 See discussion infra Part II.A, B; Jeremy Travis, Elizabeth Cincotta McBride &
Amy L. Solomon, Families Left Behind: The Hidden Costs of Incarceration and Reentry, 3, 9
THE URBAN INST. (2005), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310882_families_left
_behind.pdf (discussing child support and a multitude of complications that interfere
with family cohesiveness when a family member is incarcerated). The burdens faced
by families of incarcerated persons are not limited to the loss of CA benefits. Families
must also accept the loss of any other income contributions made by the person who
is incarcerated. See Marc Mauer, Invisible Punishment: Block Housing, Education, Voting,
FOCUS MAGAZINE 3, 4 (2003), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
cc_mauer-focus.pdf. Furthermore, the incarceration of a household member imposes
the additional financial burden on the family to bear expenses related to the incarcer-
ation, such as inflated communication costs imposed by phone companies and correc-
tional facilities. Id. at 4. See McGregor Smyth, From Arrest to Reintegration: A Model for
Mitigating Collateral Consequences of Criminal Proceedings, 24 CRIM. JUST. 42, 46 (2009)
(“Individuals and families begin to suffer collateral consequences from the moment
of arrest—missed days of work, the loss of a job or home after the reporting of an
arrest to a licensing agency or public housing authority, the removal of one’s
children.”).
84 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 358-2.12 (2007); see also N.Y. STATE OFFICE
OF TEMPORARY AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, http://www.otda.state.ny.us/oah/ (ex-
plaining that a fair hearing gives persons a right to have their case heard before an
Administrative Law Judge and how one can obtain such a hearing).
85 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 358-3.1(a).
86 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 358-5.9(a).
87 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.  tit. 18, § 358-3.3(a)(3).
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discontinuance of benefits.88 This means that families may be ad-
vised just 10 days prior to the date on which their CA funds—funds
they rely on to meet rent, fuel and utility payment obligations—will
be reduced.
Furthermore, where a fair hearing is not requested within 10
days of the notice date, recipients must reapply and wait a 45-day
period before they are able to be reenrolled in Cash Assistance.89
For families with such fragile budgets, these kinds of abrupt
changes that carry such far-reaching consequences can be detri-
mental to the continued maintenance of family stability.90 Finally,
it must not be forgotten that this entire fair hearing process itself
carries a financial burden on HRA and the City.91 That expense
surely exceeds the $59 to $72 per month that HRA “saves” when
one person is removed from the household calculation for CA.92 In
light of the stated HRA and OTDA objective of family stability and
maximized self-sufficiently, it follows that HRA’s policy—which ef-
88 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 358-3.3(d)(1)(iv).
89 See, e.g., In re Appeal of C.H., F.H. No. 2996554H (Office of Temp. and Disability
Assistance Oct. 18, 1998) (fair hearing).
90 See Patricia Allard, Life Sentences: Denying Welfare Benefits to Women Convicted of
Drug Offenses 9, 11 (2002), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/wo-
men_lifesentences.pdf (explaining how families must often forego basic necessities to
maintain safe housing when a reduction in cash assistance limits the family’s disposa-
ble income).
91 See, e.g., Editorial, How to Make the Welfare System Better, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1990,
at A26 (discussing the high costs and disadvantages associated with the fair hearing
process at HRA).
If a recipient fails to comply with H.R.A.’s requirements, his or her
life-sustaining benefits may be terminated. A recipient can challenge a
termination through a fair hearing. New York State holds fair hearings
at nearly five times the national rate, with more than 60,000 a year in
this city, 90 percent of the state total. This means caseworkers save time
and energy by telling a dissatisfied recipient to request a fair hearing.
By increasing caseworker morale and training, and by developing
systems to limit erroneous case closings, we believe that fair hearings,
and the high costs associated with them, can be reduced.
Providing benefits to those who are financially eligible—not puni-
tive enforcement of ill-considered technical rules—must remain a top
priority of H.R.A.
Id.
92 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.2(d) (2007). This range of values is
obtained by subtracting the allowance amount mandated by the regulation as per the
table that appears therein. For example, the table states that a household of five is
entitled to $379, while the amount corresponding to a household of four is $307. Id.
Subtracting $307 from $379 yields a difference of $72, which, according to the table,
is the most that HRA would “lose” per month by reducing the household composition
by one person. Id. See also COMM’Y SERV. SOC’Y, supra note 41 (providing a more sim-
plistic table to illustrate the breakdown of benefits available according to household
composition).
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fectively contradicts those very goals—must be reevaluated in the
interest of the families it was designed to protect.
II. NEW YORK’S TEMPORARY ABSENCE POLICY: WHY IT MATTERS
AND WHOM IT AFFECTS
The population of incarcerated individuals and their families
is of particular concern in the context of the temporary absence
policy for Cash Assistance. The gap in services that is created by the
exclusion of temporary incarceration warrants special considera-
tion due to the implications that such a revocation of benefits has
on dependent family members.
A. The Burden on Dependent Families
Under the current policy, if one member of a household is
incarcerated, HRA is authorized to reduce CA benefits notwith-
standing the reliance on those funds by other members of the fam-
ily.93 For instance, when one member of a household of three is
incarcerated, albeit temporarily, HRA’s policy erroneously catego-
rizes that household as a household of two, rather than three, per-
sons. The practical result of such a categorization is that HRA then
grants Cash Assistance—Basic CA Allowance,94 Home Energy Al-
lowance,95 and Maximum Shelter Allowance96—as well as any Food
Stamps for a two-person household instead of three.97 At first
glance, such an assessment may appear to make sense. For exam-
ple, a reduction in the Basic CA Allowance or in the provision of
Food Stamps is understandable.98 If one less household member is
present, there is one less person to feed. Logically, there would be
a corresponding reduction in the household’s total cost for food.99
93 See PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18. Accord N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18,
§ 387.14(a)(5)(iii)(f) (2007).
94 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131-a(2) (McKinney 2003); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 18, § 352.2; see also COMM’Y SERV. SOC’Y supra note 41.
95 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.5; see also COMM’Y SERV. SOC’Y, supra
note 41.
96 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.3; see also COMM’Y SERV. SOC’Y, supra
note 41.
97 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131-a (McKinney 2003).
98 Food stamps are governed by a separate statute and are unrelated to whether a
person is eligible for Cash Assistance. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18,
§ 387.14(a)(5)(iii)(f).
99 For the sake of argument, it is presumed that allocation of food stamps per
family member is proportionate to the cost of food necessary to provide adequate
nutrition for each person included in the food stamps calculation. There is ample
criticism to suggest that this is not the case. For one such critique, see, e.g., Editorial,
Why the Hungry Refuse Help, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2007, at A22 (“As many as 1.3 million
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However, the same cannot be held true for the Home Energy and
Shelter Allowance portions of Cash Assistance, resources that are
relied on collectively by the entire family irrespective of the number
present.
The cost of rent that a family pays, for instance, does not fluc-
tuate when a member of the household is not present for some or
all of the month. Likewise, the amount of gas that a family needs to
heat the home is not reduced when there is one less person resid-
ing in the dwelling.100 Electricity for lights and appliances is at
most nominally affected if there is one person less who is present
each day in the home.101 In fact, each of these costs—rent, gas,
electricity—are essentially pre-established and paid regularly ac-
cording to an average annual cycle for bill payment.102 Even home
telephone lines have monthly flat rates that are paid uniformly, ir-
respective of the precise amounts of time that the phone is used
for local calls each month.103
When a family member is temporarily incarcerated and the
Cash Assistance that the family receives is reduced, that family suf-
fers.104 The amount of money that a family loses in the Shelter Al-
lowance component of the Cash Assistance allocation under such
circumstances ranges from $22 to $117 per month, depending on
the size of the family.105 For the Home Energy component, the loss
to the family ranges from just $12.50 to $15 per month.106 These
amounts are undoubtedly small in terms of the City’s budget but
crucially important to the maintenance of stability for families sur-
viving in the most precarious of financial situations.107
New Yorkers, about one-quarter of them children, do not have enough to eat. These
are precisely the people, many from working families, whom federal food stamps are
supposed to help.”).
100 In fact, consumers may have the same fixed bill all year long. See, e.g., CON
EDISON, http://www.coned.com/customercentral/levelpayment.asp (explaining the
“Level Payment” plan, which “spreads [consumers’] payments evenly throughout the
year”) (last visited Dec. 21, 2011).
101 W. KEITH BRYANT & CATHLEEN D. ZICK, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF THE
HOUSEHOLD 79 (2006) (“[O]n average, the addition of one individual to the house-
hold raises electricity demand by 8 percent.”).
102 Id.
103 See, e.g., VERIZON, http://www22.verizon.com/Residential/HomePhone (offer-
ing a monthly flat-rate home phone plan) (last visited Dec. 21, 2011).
104 See Mauer, supra note 83.
105 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 352.3(a); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131-a(2)
(establishing that the standard of monthly need depends on the size of the house-
hold); see also CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y, supra note 41.
106 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131.3(3-d) (McKinney 2003).
107 See, e.g., Jennifer Mascia, A Woman’s Desire to Work Is Thwarted by a Body that Strains
to Keep Up, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at A19 (recounting the precarious situation of a
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While the individual who is incarcerated may have most of his
or her needs met by the correctional facility, the families left be-
hind have no such support.108 Neither rent nor utilities reduce
themselves proportionately when one tenant is temporarily absent
due to incarceration.109 Therefore, though the family’s food and
personal expenses budget would understandably decrease with one
less person to include, the cost of other basic necessities remains
the same regardless of whether the temporarily incarcerated indi-
vidual is present in the household or not.
Even if the family is not immediately evicted, it is the logical
reality that when an already delicate budget is further strained by
the reduction of Cash Assistance benefits, forced sacrifices are im-
posed on families.110 Under such precarious economic conditions,
families may be forced to forego food, fuel, or medication in order
to retain their housing.111 In some cases this reduced budget may
even drive the family into homelessness because of an inability to
pay rent.112 Such consequences, aside from the obvious harm ex-
perienced by families, also lead to an inevitable increase in the cost
to the City to provide emergency services.
B. The Children
Entire families bear the burdens of a CA recipient’s incarcera-
tion under the current policy.113 Families are twice as likely to
move to another residence or shelter when a member of the house-
disabled woman on the brink of homelessness and where food stamp allocations are
insufficient).
108 See Life Sentences: Denying Welfare Benefits to Women Convicted of Drug Offenses, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT (2006), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
9088smy.pdf (“The loss of welfare benefits adversely affects the ability of women, espe-
cially women of color, to become self-sufficient, provide for their children, and be
active participants in their communities.”).
109 See Allard, supra note 90, at 11 (explaining the difficulty of finding and securing
safe, affordable housing when reduced cash assistance limits the family income availa-
ble for rent).
110 Id. at 9 (“Due to the limited income at their disposal, low-income and poor
families often have to forego some of life’s basic necessities—such as rent, medical
and dental services, food, appliances, and utilities.”).
111 Id.
112 See id. at 9–11; see also Flores et al., supra note 17 (stating that families are two
times more likely to move to another residence or shelter when a family member is
incarcerated).
113 See, e.g., Allard, supra note 90, at 8–9 (explaining that even though a mother
who is deemed ineligible for welfare benefits does not affect the eligibility of depen-
dent children, the “loss of benefits will nonetheless put a severe strain on household
resources and on [the mother’s] ability to support and care for her children”).
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hold is incarcerated.114 When a family loses housing due to a re-
duction in Cash Assistance, the City then has to manage the
family’s crisis situation and absorb the corresponding financial, ad-
ministrative, and social costs.115 Whereas the family would other-
wise be able to retain a safe and stable home environment,
homelessness introduces the associated stress and insecurity cre-
ated by potential job loss, the need to procure safe shelter, poor
attendance and performance of children at school, vulnerability to
crime as well as any number of additional circumstantial factors.116
Aside from the financial burdens that are certainly augmented
when a family member is incarcerated,117 the child whose parent is
jailed, even if temporarily, is more likely to experience psychologi-
cal trauma and behavioral problems than his counterpart.118 Chil-
dren who witness the arrest of a parent report nightmares and
flashbacks119  and are more likely to have problems with peer rela-
tionships, to show signs of aggression, and to perform poorly in
school.120 Similarly, children experiencing homelessness have high
rates of anxiety, depression and behavioral problems.121 It is also
true that families in homeless situations are more likely to be sepa-
rated and the children are more likely to be placed in foster
care.122
Regardless of whether the family is left immediately homeless,
the precariousness of the situation may still result in the State inter-
114 Flores et al., supra note 17.
115 Has the Rise in Homelessness Prevention Spending Decreased the Shelter Population?,
INSIDE THE BUDGET NEWS FAX (N.Y.C. Independent Budget Office), Aug. 7, 2008, 2–4;
N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, INSIDE THE BUDGET 2–4 (Aug. 7, 2008) (reporting that
the total spending on the New York City shelter system was $651.3 million in 2007 and
that one-time cash assistance has risen from $76.6 million in 2004 to $114.3 million in
2007); see also Amie Vaccaro, Common Ground: Cutting the Costs of Homelessness,
TRIPLEPUNDIT.COM (May 3, 2010), http://www.triplepundit.com/2010/05/common-
ground-homelessness/; Common Ground, Annual Report 2007 17 (2008), http://
www.commonground.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/CGAnnualReport07.pdf
(reporting that the cost of a shelter bed is $64 per night while cost for a night in a city
jail cell is $167).
116 See Nat’l Alliance to End Homelessness, Promising Strategies to End Family Home-
lessness 6 (2006), http://www.hoopsforthehomeless.org/docs/hoopspaperfinal.pdf.
117 See Travis et al., supra note 83, at 5.
118 See ROSS D. PARKE & K. ALISON CLARKE-STEWART, EFFECTS OF PARENTAL INCARCER-
ATION ON YOUNG CHILDREN, 3–6 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. & The Urban
Inst. (2001).
119 Id. at 4.
120 Id. at 6.
121 Nat’l Alliance to End Homelessness, supra note 116.
122 Id.
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vening to place children in foster care.123 For example, a family
crisis caused by the temporary absence of a parent in a single-par-
ent household may be surmountable where CA disbursements are
continued in order for a temporary caregiver to be able to use the
funds to maintain stability in the children’s lives.124 When CA
funds are terminated, however, such an option may be unavailable
and may require removing the children from the home to place-
ment in foster care.125 Whether the issue is homelessness, foster
care, or purely the stress and disruption of a volatile family situa-
tion, children and families suffer.126
Statistics indicate that based on numbers alone, the societal
benefits of family stability are abundantly clear. Aside from the
pain, stress, and crisis that result when families are separated by the
State, the costs of both foster care and of family homelessness are
undeniably high. It is estimated that the cost of placing two chil-
dren in foster care is approximately $34,000 per year.127 The an-
nual cost to taxpayers to provide an emergency shelter bed to a
person experiencing homelessness is estimated to be $8,067 more
than the cost of a Section 8 housing voucher, which averages about
$6,805 per year.128 According to Common Ground, an organiza-
123 See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1055 (West, Westlaw through 2009, ch. 1–14, 16–43 and
50–59).
124 See, e.g., Barbara Vobejda & Judith Havemann, Child-Only Cases Rise on Welfare
Rolls; Parents Ineligible or Absent; A Policy Debate Is Reborn, WASH. POST., Jan. 2, 1999, at
A1 (discussing the reliance on family members to care for dependent children when
parents are absent and how some states have begun programs that pay relatives to
care for children); see also, e.g., Joy Rothke, Justice for Criminals; Help for Women on the
Wrong Side of the Law, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 1999, at 3 (discussing the difficulties of keep-
ing families intact when a parent is incarcerated and how it is estimated that “grand-
mothers or other female relatives raise 60–65 percent of the children of incarcerated
women[ ] [while] 30–35 percent end up in foster care”).
125 See NAN P. ROMAN & PHYLLIS WOLFE, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS,
WEB OF FAILURE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOSTER CARE AND HOMELESSNESS 29
(1995) (noting that of 112 respondents who lived in foster care, one-fifth were placed
because of the incarceration of a parent); Homeless Youth, NCH FACT SHEET #13, (Nat’l
Coalition for the Homeless), Aug. 2008, at 1–2 (explaining that “[s]ome youth may
become homeless when their families suffer financial crises resulting from lack of
affordable housing, limited employment opportunities, insufficient wages, no medical
insurance, or inadequate welfare benefits . . . [and are separated from their families]
by shelter, transitional housing, or child welfare policies.”).
126 See Allard, supra note 90, at 13 (discussing the adverse effects—such as poor
school performance, behavioral and mental health problems, drug use, teen preg-
nancy, and delinquency—that stressful family environments have on children).
127 Nat’l Alliance to End Homelessness, supra note 116, at 23.
128 Id. The New York City Housing Authority provides needy families with vouchers
that pay part of the rent for eligible families by means of the Section 8 Housing Assis-
tance program. N.Y.C. Housing Auth., Guide To Section 8 Housing Assistance Program 1
(2008), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/070213N.pdf; see also U.S.
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tion in New York dedicated to the eradication of homelessness,
“the cost to society of letting someone be homeless” can reach as
high as $41,000 per year.129 This means that every time the State
prevents a family from becoming homeless, the burden on the fam-
ilies involved—as well as that absorbed by taxpayers—is reduced.
Cash Assistance and its pertaining temporary absence policy were
designed in recognition of this reality.130 Nonetheless, HRA’s im-
proper refusal to include incarceration within the scope of eligible
temporary absence situations has undermined the intended bene-
fits of this explicit public policy objective.131 In addition, HRA’s
policy weakens the statutory mandate that requires social service
providers to provide assistance to and promote the unity of needy
families.132
C. A Search for Support After Incarceration
Aside from maintaining a secure household for the family,
cash allowances for shelter, utilities, and fuel also help to ensure
that the temporarily incarcerated individual has a safe and stable
home to return to.133 Often, people returning from short jail terms
come to rely on public housing as their only means to avoid home-
lessness.134 It is only logical, therefore, that the very same continu-
ing needs assessment that is contemplated for other temporarily
absent persons seeking assistance from HRA—including the need
to maintain a home, secure employment, and support a family—
applies equally to people who are temporarily incarcerated and
Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C.A § 1437f(o) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-35 (ex-
cluding P.L. 111-31)).
129 Vaccaro, supra note 115.
130 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131-a (McKinney 2003); 26 N.Y. Reg. 15 (Apr. 28,
2004).
131 See 26 N.Y. Reg. 15 (Apr. 28, 2004) (stating that the temporary absence policy
would reduce confusion, reduce administrative labor, and reduce costs for social ser-
vices providers).
132 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131-a; 26 N.Y. Reg. 15 (Apr. 28, 2004) (“[S]ocial ser-
vices officials must, in accordance with the regulations of [OTDA], provide public
assistance to needy persons who are eligible therefore.” (emphasis added)); see also,
e.g., In re Chrystol B., 429 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980) (stating that it is the
public policy to “preserve and reunite the family unit whenever possible”).
133 James Austin, John Irwin & Patricia Hardyman, Exploring the Needs and Risks of the
Returning Prisoner Population 8 URBAN INSTITUTE (2001), http://www.urban.org/up
loadedpdf/410626_ReturningPrisonerPopulation.pdf (noting that residential insta-
bility and unemployment are closely related to crime rates and violence in persons
returning from a period of incarceration).
134 Caterina Gouvis Roman and Jeremy Travis, Where Will I Sleep Tomorrow? Housing,
Homelessness, and the Returning Prisoner, 17 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 389, 397 (2006).
128 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:105
who will soon return to their families.135
Before moving on to analyze the myriad risks faced by those
who return from periods of incarceration, it must be reiterated
that the exclusion of incarceration from the definition of tempo-
rary absence applies regardless of whether the person is actually
found guilty of a crime.136 Moreover, it must not be forgotten that
the majority of individuals who experience incarceration—whether
they are actually sentenced or not—are released in less than two
weeks.137 Nevertheless, at least statistically, the sole fact that a per-
son is incarcerated heightens that individual’s risk of future en-
counters with the criminal justice system.138 Absent a safe place to
return with their families—a possibility amplified by HRA’s current
policy—persons returning from jail are more likely to utilize delin-
quent means to satisfy basic needs.139
Rates of recidivism for formerly incarcerated individuals are
already high.140 However, these rates increase further when the in-
dividual is rendered homeless upon release from prison or jail be-
cause individuals experiencing homelessness or family crisis are
more likely to be involved in criminal activity.141 This propensity is
exacerbated still more because persons experiencing homelessness
are more likely to be stigmatized as deviant or anti-social and,
135 The needs assessment for all individuals and families is based on a case-by-case
evaluation according to the particular needs at issue. See 26 N.Y. Reg. 15 (Apr. 28,
2004) (“Payments to public assistance recipients who are temporarily absent from the
public assistance household are limited to the standard of need.”); N.Y SOC. SERV.
LAW § 131-a(2) (establishing that the standard of monthly need depends on the size
of the family); see also Nat’l District Attorneys Ass’n, Policy Positions on Prisoner Reentry
Issues 2 (2005), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/policy_position_prisoner_reentry_july_17_
05.pdf (“[People] reenter our communities in need of housing, medical and mental
health treatment, employment, counseling and a variety of other services. Communi-
ties are often overwhelmed by these increased demands and, due to budget con-
straints, unable to provide minimum services to [people returning from jail or
prison].”).
136 See PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18.
137 N.Y.C. Indep. Budget Office, supra note 29.
138 A U.S. Department of Justice study showed that of nearly 300,000 prisoners dis-
charged in 15 states, 67.5% were rearrested within three years of their release. PAT-
RICK A. LANAN & DAVID J. LEVIN,  RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, 1 (U.S.
Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics) (June 2002), available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf.
139 Greg A. Greenberg & Robert A. Rosenheck, Jail Incarceration, Homelessness, and
Mental Health: A National Study, 59(2) PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 170, 170–76 (Feb. 2008)
(indicating the correlation between homelessness and involvement in criminal activ-
ity), http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/reprint/59/2/170; see also Roman
& Travis, supra note 134, at 395.
140 See LANAN & LEVIN, supra note 138.
141 Greenberg & Rosenheck, supra note 139; see also Roman & Travis, supra note
134, at 395.
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therefore, more likely to resort to illegal activities as a means of
survival.142
In New York, approximately 40% of persons released to their
communities return to jail within one year.143 The abovemen-
tioned tendency of those experiencing homelessness to be involved
in criminal activity is particularly relevant in the present context
because recidivism rates are generally highest during the first
weeks and months following the person’s release.144 Similarly, peo-
ple who are released and do not have stable housing are more
likely to return to prison than those who have a fixed housing ar-
rangement.145 It follows that when an individual has lost his or her
housing during a period of incarceration—a plausible occurrence
under the current interpretation of “temporary absence”—he or
she may be more likely to commit another crime and to be re-
incarcerated.146
Conversely, by inference, if a formerly incarcerated individual
is able to return to a safe home, he or she may be less vulnerable
and less likely to commit a crime during the crucial weeks and
months following release.147 Aside from the sociological conse-
quences of criminal behavior by repeat offenders, recidivism car-
ries with it a high economic cost for society as well. In fact, in
monetary terms—based on a calculation of victimization, process-
ing, and corrections costs in a Massachusetts study—it is estimated
that the average expected cost for society to process a recidivating
person is $49,123.148
142 DENNIS P. CULHANE & STEPHEN METRAUX,  HOMELESS SHELTER USE AND REIN-
CARCERATION FOLLOWING PRISON RELEASE: ASSESSING THE RISK 3 (Univ. of Pennsylvania
2002), http://povertyandhomelessness.wikispaces.com/file/view/dennis_culhane_
prison_paper.pdf.
143 N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 29.
144 Amy L. Solomon et al., Life After Lockup, URBAN INST. 43 (2008), http://www.
urban.org/UploadedPDF/411660_life_after_lockup.pdf.
145 Id. at 19.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 This calculation is based on a statistical analysis of the average victimization,
processing, and corrections costs in each of four categories of offenses: violent, prop-
erty, drug, and public order. Processing costs are based on estimates in the costs of
investigation, arrest, prosecution, court-related costs, as well as the average costs of
labor for time spent by professionals working on the case. Though the true costs of
victimization concededly cannot be determined, the study based such costs on eco-
nomic literature that included medical expenses resulting from injury, productivity
losses, and intangible costs associated with pain and suffering. The corrections cost is
based on a mean sentence of 263 days across offenses and uses an average cost of
$78/day as reported by Hampden County, MA, where this unique and extensive study
was carried out. Thus, the figure cited, $49,123, represents the average total cost of
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A policy that, in practice, makes it more difficult for families
experiencing difficult financial situations to remain intact, that cre-
ates instability for vulnerable children, and that makes the re-entry
process more difficult to overcome does not benefit New York fam-
ilies. Nor does such a policy further the objectives of the United
States Congress in establishing Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (“TANF”) and the parallel objective of the New York State
legislature in creating New York State Safety Net—programs that
collectively fund Cash Assistance in New York.149 The underlying
goals of self-sufficiency and family cohesiveness remain unchanged
when a household member is temporarily incarcerated.150
A policy that departs from those goals undeniably results in a
higher cost to taxpayers.151 The consequences of failing to effica-
ciously pursue these objectives, and the resultant disruption of fam-
ily stability, manifest as economic and social problems that the City
and State are forced to confront and resolve. In the face of such a
reality, the benefits and real cost-savings of maintaining cohesive
families by including incarceration within the scope of the tempo-
rary absence definition clearly outweigh the abovementioned costs
that must otherwise be incurred by the City and State. It is with all
of these considerations in mind that the temporary absence policy
must include incarceration under the same standards that would
be applied to any other situation that causes the temporary ab-
sence of the recipient.
III. STATISTICS, FACTS, AND NUMBERS: WHAT THE DATA SHOWS
A. Incarceration Periods Are Generally Brief
The majority of individuals who are incarcerated are detained
for short periods of time. On a national level, according to the Ur-
ban Institute, jails have contact with as many people in three weeks
victimization, processing, and corrections for an offense irrespective of which “type of
offense” is committed. John Roman & Aaron Chalfin, Does It Pay to Invest in Reentry
Programs for Jail Inmates? 18 (2006), http://www.urban.org/projects/reentry-round-
table/upload/roman_chalfin.pdf.
149 See Family Independence Admin., N.Y.C. HUMAN RES. ADMIN., DEP’T OF SOCIAL
SERVS., http://www.nyc.gov/html/hra/html/programs/fia.shtml; N.Y. SOC. SERV.
LAW § 131(1) (McKinney 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2006) (stating that one of the
four purposes of TANF is family cohesiveness by “encourag[ing] the formation and
maintenance of two-parent families”); About TANF, Admin. for Children and Families,
Office of Family Assistance, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., http://www.
acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/tanf/about.html (stating as the mission of the federal
TANF program is “to help needy families achieve self-sufficiency”).
150 See Travis et al., supra note 83.
151 See discussion supra Part II.B–C.
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as prisons do over the course of an entire year.152 More than 80%
of individuals incarcerated in jail are there for less than one
month.153 Only 13% are estimated to stay longer than two months,
7% longer than four months, and just 4% longer than six
months.154 According to the New York City Department of Correc-
tion, in 2008 the average daily jail population was 13,850 and there
were a total of 107,516 admissions to correctional facilities.155 The
average length of stay for city-sentenced persons was 34.3 days
while that for all detainees at Rikers Island was 49.4 days.156 How-
ever, the median length of stay for all persons incarcerated in New
York City in 2008 was just 7.74 days while that for those who served
time after sentencing was an even shorter 7.70 days.157
Statistics show that the inmate population at Rikers Island is
an inherently temporary population. Of all admissions during
2007, 28% were released within 3 days, 47% within 7 days, 58%
within 15 days, 70% within 30 days, 80% within 60 days, 85% within
90 days, and 92% within 180 days.158 Over two-thirds of the popula-
tion is released within one month while a noteworthy 92% of the
individuals whose benefits would be revoked due to their incarcera-
tion under the current policy actually fall within the six-month
threshold period that is deemed permissible for other “good
causes” to excuse a “temporary absence.”159
Situations where persons remain incarcerated but not con-
victed of any crimes illustrate perhaps the strongest case for includ-
ing incarceration within the definition of “temporary absence.”160
Such circumstances arise when a recipient has been arrested and
152 Solomon et al., supra note 144, at xv.
153 See id. at 5–6.
154 Id.
155 City of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 66.
156 Id.
157 N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 29.
158 Martin F. Horn, Comm’r of N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr. & Prob., PowerPoint presenta-
tion given at the Mayors’ Summit on Reentry & Employment (Feb. 28, 2008) (hand-
out on file with author).
159 Id.; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a)(2) (2007).
160 The case presented by this class of individuals who have not been convicted of a
crime is also strengthened in light of the limitations enumerated in § 131(12) and
§ 131(14) of the New York Social Services Law. Subsection 12 of the statute withholds
public assistance to those who have been convicted in federal or state court for mak-
ing a fraudulent statement or representation in order to obtain public assistance,
medical assistance, or food stamps. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131(12) (McKinney 2003).
Subsection 14 prohibits those who are “fleeing to avoid prosecution or custody or
conviction” or those who have violated a condition of their parole. § 131(14)(a)(i),
(ii). Those who are merely incarcerated, without more, would not fall within these
statutory restrictions.
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remains detained in jail—due to an inability to post bail—while
awaiting trial or pre-trial motions.161 In essence, many such inmates
remain confined simply because of their indigence alone.162
In fact, the majority of those detained at Rikers Island have not
yet been convicted of any crime.163 At any given time approxi-
mately 80% of detainees at the Rikers Island jail have been neither
convicted nor sentenced, but nonetheless can have the CA benefits
that their families rely on cut under the current policy.164 With that
in mind, it is important to remember that our criminal justice sys-
tem is grounded by a fundamental concept that presumes each ac-
cused individual to be innocent until proven guilty.165 HRA’s policy
does not adhere to that fundamental tenet. Not only can those who
have not been convicted of any crime be punished, but the policy
goes a step further by effectively punishing innocent family mem-
bers by forcing them to bear the burdens imposed on them by the
hasty punitive measures that the erroneous interpretation de-
mands. Under HRA’s current policy, the presumption of inno-
cence is simply ignored despite the drastic consequences that such
a premature condemnation has for families.
Given that such a large percentage of people in jail remain
confined prior to any judicial determination of guilt—and in rec-
ognition of the documented brevity of the average stay—there is
much evidence to support the contention that such absences fall
squarely within the definition of “temporary.”
People in jail generally intend to return to their homes,166 are
161 See Wynn, supra note 68. At least one court has recognized the inherent discrimi-
nation in forcing arrestees to choose between payment of a fine or incarceration. In a
California case, holding that incarceration did constitute “good cause” for employ-
ment absence, the court said that “[c]ompulsion to serve a sentence which is imposed
only in lieu of the primary penalty, a fine, which cannot be paid because of the indi-
gence of the defendant constitutes invidious discrimination in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Kaylor v. Dep’t of Human Res.,
108 Cal. Rptr. 267, 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
162 See JENNIFER WYNN, INSIDE RIKERS: STORIES FROM THE WORLD’S LARGEST PENAL
COLONY 6 (2001) (“They are detained because they cannot afford bail. Illustrating
their poverty, one-quarter of Rikers inmates face bails of $500 or less. ‘Unlike white,
employed, middle-class persons, who are perceived as being reputable and thus are
generally released on their own recognizance or are able to make bail . . . [those
perceived as] disreputable persons are detained.’”).
163 See Wynn, supra note 68.
164 Trymaine Lee, To Help Rikers, City Wants More Prisoners in Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 2007, at B3.
165 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456–60 (1895) (illustrating that the pre-
sumption of innocence is deeply rooted in the foundation of American criminal law).
166 It should be noted that some states simply presume that an incarcerated person
intends to return to the place where he was residing before he was incarcerated. For
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“prevented from doing so because of good cause”167 and “do[ ] not
evidence intent to establish residence elsewhere.”168 It is of notable
importance that, in New York, according to the Court of Appeals,
“a patient or inmate of an institution does not gain or lose a resi-
dence or domicile, but retains the domicile he had when he en-
tered the institution.”169 Even the New York State Constitution
provides that a person’s legal residence should not be altered while
she is incarcerated.170 As HRA continues to improperly limit the
example, in Maine—which along with Vermont is one of only two states that permits
voting for incarcerated persons—an incarcerated person is permitted to elect as his
residence any jurisdiction where he resided prior to being incarcerated. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 112(14) (West, Westlaw through ch. 651 of the 2009 1st Reg.
Sess. of the 124th Legis.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2122(a) (West, Westlaw through
No. 82 of Adjourned Sess. of 2009-2010 sess.) (“A person shall not gain or lose a
residence solely by reason of presence or absence . . . while confined in a prison or
correctional institution.”); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2025 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg.
Sess. laws) (“A person does not gain or lose a domicile solely by reason of his or her
presence or absence from a place . . . while kept in an almshouse, asylum or prison.”);
cf. Jack Maskell, Congressional Candidacy, Incarceration, and the Constitution’s Inhabitancy
Qualification 11 (2002), http://lugar.senate.gov/services/pdf_crs/congress/Congres-
sional_Candidacy_Incarceration_and_the_Constitutions_Inhabitancy_Qualification.
pdf (discussing the inhabitancy requirement to seek office in the House of
Representatives):
However, absence from the State—particularly involuntary absence,
such as if one had been injured and hospitalized out of State, or had
been involuntarily removed from the State to another State, would not
appear, in itself, to be the only consideration or even the determinant
factor in judging “inhabitancy” in that State from which elected. The
involuntary nature of the relocation to another State would, in fact, sig-
nificantly militate against a finding that such person intended to aban-
don his inhabitancy and residency in the first State.
Id. Of paramount importance is that a person does not generally intend to establish
residence in prison or jail. Even in New York, under § 349.4 of the NYCRR, it is pre-
sumptively inferable that a person’s residence prior to incarceration remains that per-
son’s residence while he is incarcerated. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18,
§ 349.4(a) (stating, inter alia, that a person’s absence is considered a “temporary ab-
sence” as long as he “does not evidence intent to establish residence elsewhere”). It was
PD No. 08-16-ELI that shifted the burden to the person who is temporarily absent and
changed that presumption. PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18 (changing the intent
element by requiring a person who is absent to “establish[ ] the intent to return to the
household” (emphasis added)).
167 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a)(2).
168 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a)(ii). Notably, in the context of
medical assistance, for which the same temporary absence statute governs, even when
a person left the country for six months and where facts were uncertain about
whether she intended to return to New York, it was held that there was insufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the trip was “anything other than a temporary visit.”
Hutchings v. Brezenoff, 467 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (App. Div. 1983).
169 Corr v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 305 N.E.2d 485, 485 (N.Y. 1973).
170 N.Y. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“[N]o person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a
residence, by reason of his presence or absence . . . while confined to any public
prison.”).
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state regulation, both the individuals and their families are ad-
versely affected when a household member is temporarily incarcer-
ated.171 This remains true even in cases where the person is
acquitted of the crime charged or when those charges are subse-
quently dropped.172
Since the overwhelming majority of persons incarcerated at
Rikers Island fall precisely within the guidelines of what constitutes
a “temporary absence,” the regulations should be interpreted ac-
cordingly.173 Such a regulatory construction is the appropriate and
necessary way for HRA to facilitate stability in the lives of at-risk
individuals as well as their dependent families.
B. A Disproportionate Risk for Poor People of Color
The influence of race, class, and gender on arrest and incar-
ceration cannot be ignored. People of color are disproportionately
affected by this country’s increase in incarceration rates.174 Data
from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics illustrate that in 2000
nearly ten percent of young black men were incarcerated, com-
pared to slightly more than one percent of whites in the same age
cohort.175 A study by the Sentencing Project, a national organiza-
tion that promotes prison reform and alternatives to incarcera-
tion,176 found that “a black boy born in 2001 stood a 32 percent
chance of being imprisoned at some point in his life, compared to
171 See discussion supra Part II.
172 See PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18. Although PD No. 08-16-ELI does not ad-
dress the issues of acquittal or the dropping of charges, the policy directive does not
contemplate the possibility of either of these outcomes. Because the policy directive
reduces benefits based on incarceration and not conviction, it is at least plausible that
benefits will be denied even when the person is released without ever being convicted
of a crime. See Wynn, supra note 68.
173 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a); PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note
18.
174 See MARC MAUER, THE RACE TO INCARCERATE 139 (1999) (“African Americans,
therefore, have a seven times greater chance of being incarcerated than do whites.”);
Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class
Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151, 152–53 (2004) (discussing data
that suggest that “blacks are punitively policed, prosecuted, and sentenced”). Pettit
and Western also provide a detailed analysis, using data from 1974 to 1999, to demon-
strate that the incarceration rate of black males is approximately ten times that of
white males. Id. at 156–58; William J. Sabol, Heather C. West & Matthew Cooper,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2008 8, tbl.8 (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf (demonstrating an average annual increase of 2.5% in the
U.S. prison and jail population).
175 Sabol, West & Cooper, supra note 174, at 2 (stating that “[b]lack males were
incarcerated at a rate six and a half times higher than white males” in 2008).
176 About Us, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/tem-
plate/page.cfm?id=2 (last visited December 12, 2010).
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a 17 percent chance for a Hispanic boy and a 6 percent chance for
a white boy.”177 Data also suggest that the higher incarceration
rates of people of color are accounted for substantially by the
higher rates of arrest that are experienced by those populations.178
Discussing misdemeanor policing in New York City, Professor
Babe Howell surmises that “it seems reasonable to assume that the
hundreds of thousands of arrests made during the past six years
under an aggressive misdemeanor policing strategy have had a dis-
proportionate impact on communities of color in New York
City.”179 Such an assertion is only supported further by earlier data,
which demonstrate that people of color are significantly more
likely to receive jail sentences for property offenses and misde-
meanors than are their white counterparts.180 The data simply
make clear that minorities in New York City are more likely to have
encounters with law enforcement. Thus, it is axiomatic that the
temporary absence policy—whose very function is triggered by con-
tact with the criminal justice system—has a disproportionate effect
on minorities and should not be permitted as a means to refuse
necessary benefits to families.
People of color are more likely to be stopped by police while
177 MAUER, supra note 174, at 137.
178 Id. at 160 (noting that while African Americans constitute 13 percent of the U.S.
population, they accounted for 32 percent of arrests for drug possession in 2000); see
Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revisited, 64 U.
COLO. L. REV. 743, 746, 759 (1993) (noting the results of a previous study, in 1979,
indicated that “eighty percent of the disproportionality in prison was explained just by
the differential involvement in arrest,” and concluding that after a 1991 study the
ratio of arrest rates of blacks to whites ranges “between five and ten to one”); Robert
D. Crutchfield, George S. Bridges & Susan R. Pritchard, Analytical and Aggregation Bi-
ases in Analyses of Imprisonment: Reconciling Discrepancies in Studies of Racial Disparity, 31 J.
RES. CRIM. & DELINQ. 166, 179 (1994) (discussing how disproportionate rates of incar-
ceration are explained by disproportionate arrest rates of African Americans); see also,
Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Ter-
rorism, and Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 3 (Oct. 29, 2009) (testimony of Marc
Mauer, Executive Director of The Sentencing Project) (“[W]hile greater involvement
in some crimes is related to higher rates of incarceration for African Americans, the
weight of the evidence to date suggests that a significant proportion of the disparities
we currently observe is not a function of disproportionate criminal behavior.”).
179 Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Or-
der-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 291 (2009) (citing data
showing that approximately 86% of persons arrested for misdemeanors in New York
City are nonwhite).
180 James F. Nelson, N.Y. State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Disparities in Process-
ing Felony Arrests in New York State, 1990–1992 viii–xii (1995); see MAUER, supra note
174, at 153 (discussing how among persons with no prior record of being arrested for
a felony, whites are more likely than blacks or Hispanics to have the charges reduced
to misdemeanors or infractions).
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driving181 and are more likely to be stopped under “stop-and-frisk”
policies of the New York City Police Department.182 In 2009, of
575,000 New Yorkers who were stopped by the police, only 53,000
were white.183 The New York Times reported that “Blacks and Lati-
nos were nine times as likely as whites to be stopped by the police
in New York City in 2009, but, once stopped, were no more likely to
be arrested.”184 The statistics, however, are no better for those who
are actually arrested.
According to one study completed in 2003, black males are 2.3
times and Hispanic males 1.3 times more likely to be arrested for
misdemeanor marijuana crimes in Manhattan than their white
counterparts.185 Similarly, black males were found to be 2.66 times
more likely and Hispanic males 1.85 times more likely than white
males to be detained following an arrest but before they are ar-
raigned.186 The study emphasized that the heightened likelihood
of arrest and detention has a “substantial and disproportionate im-
pact on black and Hispanic communities.”187 Where blacks make
up 23% and Hispanics just 25% of the population but account for
84% of arrests in New York City, policymakers, in crafting a given
policy, must consider how such disparities could have a similar dis-
parate impact on these same marginalized communities of color.188
181 MAUER, supra note 174, at 141–42 (“Although African Americans and Hispanics
represented only five percent of drivers on the country’s highways [in the late 1980s],
more than 70 percent of all drivers stopped were either African American or Hispanic
. . . and represented 80 percent of the cars that were searched following a stop.”).
182 Expert Report of Jeffrey Fagan at 4, Floyd v. City of New York, 08 Civ. 01034
(SAS) (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 16, 2008), http://ccrjustice.org/files/Expert_Report_Jef-
freyFagan.pdf; Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the NYPD’s
Stop-And-Frisk Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 19 COLOMBIA PUBLIC LAW
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 05-95, 10 (June 16, 2006), http://www.stat.columbia.edu/
~gelman/research/unpublished/frisk7.pdf (discussing the data showing that blacks
and Hispanics are “stopped” more often than whites by police); see also DAVID COLE,
NO EQUAL JUSTICE 43–45 (The New Press 1999) (discussing how “stop-and-frisk” poli-
cies have been held constitutional based on the “reasonable suspicion that police of-
ficers have to stop people in “high-crime areas,” which tend to be low-income and
heavily populated by blacks and Hispanics).
183 Al Baker, City Minorities More Likely to Be Frisked, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A1.
184 Id.
185 Andrew Golub, Bruce D. Johnson & Eloise Dunlap, The Race/Ethnicity Disparity in
Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 6(1) CRIMINOLOGY & PUBLIC POLICY
131, 145–47 (2007) (presenting data to illustrate the disproportionate rates of arrests
and detention of individuals based on race), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.
nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=2561263&blobtype=pdf.
186 Id. at 147, 148 tbl.2.
187 Id. at 155.
188 Id. at 145–46. At the state level, the situation is only worse. According to yet
another study, blacks represent only 17.4% of the population in New York State but
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Although it is difficult to ascertain data that demonstrate ar-
rest and incarceration rate distributions by class or income level,
the intersection between race and class is an instructive guidepost.
As stated by Marc Mauer, founder and executive director of The
Sentencing Project, “when we speak about race and the criminal
justice system, we are often in fact also talking about class.”189 Be-
cause of the ongoing presence of housing segregation, communi-
ties of color are more likely to be isolated from centers of
employment and more likely to contain pockets of extreme pov-
erty.190 According to a 1997 survey conducted by the Justice De-
partment, “68 percent of prisoners had not completed high school,
53 percent earned less than $1,000 in the month prior to their in-
carceration, and nearly one half were either unemployed or work-
ing only part-time prior to their arrest.”191 Not surprisingly,
individuals with limited resources face still more obstacles when
trying to navigate the criminal justice system.192 Aside from the in-
ability to make bail, low-income defendants are often plagued by
an inability to afford adequate legal defense to advocate on their
behalf.193
These statistics make it clear that “willful acts” are not the sole
indicator to explain the likelihood that a given person will be ar-
rested and detained. In a society where males, especially males of
color, are more likely to be arrested and incarcerated while women
are more likely to be forced to bear burdens at home, the effect
that the temporary absence policy has on families cannot be evalu-
ated without careful consideration of the influence of race, class
and gender.194 The affected populations are disproportionately
scourged by poverty and unjustifiably targeted by a broken crimi-
account for 51.4 % of drug arrests. Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in
the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 286 (2009).
189 MAUER, supra note 174, at 177.
190 Id. at 184.
191 Id. at 178.
192 See, e.g., Smyth, supra note 83, at 43. (“More than 80 percent of those charged
with crimes are too poor to afford an attorney.”).
193 Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, supra note 178, at 4–5 (discussing the disadvantages
faced by low-income people including inadequate financial resources, treatment, and
legal representation throughout the guilt and sentencing phases of the criminal jus-
tice process).
194 MAUER, supra note 174, at 202 (“[A]s of 2003, nearly 8 percent, or one in thir-
teen, of all black males were incarcerated in a prison or jail on any given day.”); see
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 108 (explaining the adverse effects of losing
welfare benefits and the burdens often shouldered by women and children); see also
discussion supra Part II.A, B.
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nal justice system. Policymakers, like those charged with the draft-
ing and enforcement of the temporary absence policy, must
remain attuned to the causes and effects of such disparities in or-
der to remain faithful to the statutory mandate to provide for the
neediest and most at-risk populations of New York.195
Not only are poor people of color more likely to be arrested,
they are, not surprisingly, more likely to be in need of programs
like food stamps and CA.196 It follows that they are less likely to be
able to post bail. Ultimately, the practical effect of disproportion-
ate arrest rates for males on the street coupled with the dispropor-
tionate representation of poor families of women and children left
at home demonstrates that HRA’s temporary absence policy strikes
at the heart of New York’s most vulnerable populations.
IV. OTHER PROGRAMS AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Following the Lead of Other Programs
Other public benefit programs have been willing to acknowl-
edge the need to address this uniquely vulnerable population and
take into consideration the impact on dependent families. For ex-
ample, Medicaid policy was recently changed to allow individuals
who are incarcerated to suspend, rather than close, their Medicaid
status and then reactivate it upon release.197 Generally, in other
situations, where the legislature has intended to exclude incarcer-
ated persons from eligibility, it has said so explicitly. For instance,
the Social Services Law and its pertaining regulations provide that
if the Agency has “reliable information” that the recipient has been
“admitted or committed to an institution or prison,” he or she be-
comes ineligible for benefits as a member of the household.198 Sim-
ilarly, both federal and state Food Stamps regulations exclude
residents of institutions that provide more than half of their
meals.199 Here, however neither the statute nor the state regulation
addresses or even suggests that there was an intention to exclude
incarceration from the broadly constructed definition of tempo-
195 26 N.Y. Reg. 14 (Apr. 28, 2004) (“[S]ocial services officials must, in accordance
with the regulations of [OTDA], provide public assistance to needy persons who are
eligible therefore.” (emphasis added)).
196 See HRA Facts Quarterly, supra note 4.
197 Administrative Directive No. 08 OHIP/ADM-3, State of N.Y. Dep’t of Health
(Apr. 21, 2008).
198 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 358-3.3(d)(1)(iv) (2007); tit. 18,
§ 387.14(a)(5)(iii)(f) [Food Stamps]; see also 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(b)(7)(vi) (West,
Westlaw through June 12, 2009) [Food Stamps only].
199 7 C.F.R. 273.1(b)(7)(vi); tit. 18, § 387.14(a)(5)(iii)(f).
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rary absence.200
With this in mind, Federal Social Security Administration reg-
ulations governing the provision of benefits are particularly in-
structive. Section 404.468 of the Code of Federal Regulations
stipulates that no monthly benefits will be paid to individuals who
are “confined in jail, prison, or another kind of penal institution or
correctional facility for conviction of a felony.201 However, the reg-
ulation clarifies that the exemption from receiving benefits “ap-
plies only to the prisoner; benefit payments to any other person
who is entitled on the basis of the prisoner’s wages and self-employ-
ment income are payable as though the prisoner were receiving
benefits.”202 Likewise, where families rely on CA benefits for rent
and utilities, it is consistent and reasonable that such funds simi-
larly be “payable as though the prisoner were receiving benefits” in
order to support families and further the stated objectives of Cash
Assistance to help New York’s needy families.203 It should be fur-
ther noted that, consistent with § 402(x) of the Social Security Act,
the termination of benefits to incarcerated persons applies only to
those who have actually been convicted of a felony, a limitation that
has not been followed by HRA as regards temporary absence.204
Further guidance regarding the manner in which incarcera-
tion should be interpreted within the context of public benefits
can be seen in the language of fair hearing decisions issued by
OTDA. For instance, it has been held that “each case of this kind
must be evaluated on a case by case basis” in order for recipients to
be provided an “ongoing grant of [Cash] Assistance benefits in ac-
cordance with [their] verified degree of need.”205Although some
fair hearing decisions have maintained that Cash Assistance, Medi-
200 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131 (McKinney 2003); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 18, § 349.4(a).
201 20 C.F.R. § 404.468 (West, Westlaw through June 12, 2009).
202 Id.; cf. Zipkin v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 16, 19 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that the
court’s decision to uphold the termination of retirement benefits to an incarcerated
person should not be construed to affect the benefits of dependents of incarcerated
persons).
203 See N.Y.C. HUMAN RES. ADMIN., supra note 37; see also 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2006);
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 5. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 98-47
(1983) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 404, 448 (explaining that with
respect to social security benefits, the congressional intent of an amendment “would
eliminate all benefits to felons during their period of incarceration . . . Benefits of
dependents and survivors of incarcerated felons would not be affected.”).
204 42 U.S.C. § 402(x) (2006). Compare PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18 (authoriz-
ing the termination of cash assistance when a recipient is incarcerated regardless
whether such person has yet been convicted of any crime).
205 In re Appeal of B.J., F.H. No. 2037464H, at 3 (Office of Temp. and Disability
Assistance Oct. 12, 1993) (fair hearing).
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cal Assistance, and Food Stamps may be discontinued upon incar-
ceration, it has been established that those benefits must be
restored without a new application if incarceration lasts 30 days or
less and the individual remains in need.206
HRA’s exclusion of incarceration from the definition of tem-
porary absence is also inconsistent with judicial interpretation of
“good cause.” Notably, incarceration has been held sufficient to es-
tablish “good cause” for failure to appear at fair hearings concern-
ing the provision of Cash Assistance in New York.207 Decisions in
fair hearings have held that “good cause” includes “circumstances
beyond the individual’s control, such as but not limited to, illness
of the member, illness of another household member . . . a house-
hold emergency, or the lack of adequate child care . . . .”208
Where a recipient claims “good cause,” he or she is responsi-
ble for notifying the Agency to support that claim, and the Agency
must then review the information provided to determine whether
the evidence substantiates such a finding.209 In Appeal of Anony-
mous, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that the appel-
lant’s incarceration constituted “good cause” for absence because
it was an “unrelated event” and, therefore, did not justify revoca-
tion of Cash Assistance benefits.210 Similarly, where an appellant
failed to attend a scheduled fair hearing because he was incarcer-
ated and did not receive the letter advising him of the hearing, the
ALJ in Appeal of CM excused the absence from a fair hearing be-
cause it was held that the incarceration was sufficient to satisfy the
“good cause” standard.211
Consistent with statutory and regulatory mandates, courts have
held that before Cash Assistance benefits can be terminated for
failure to comply with a work requirement, the non-compliance
must be found to be willful.212 Though incarceration may arguably
206 In re Appeal of C.H., F.H. No. 2996554H, at 4 (Office of Temp. and Disability
Assistance Oct. 18, 1998) (fair hearing).
207 In re Appeal of C.M., F.H. No. 4286162Z, at 9 (Office of Temp. and Disability
Assistance Feb. 23, 2005) (fair hearing); In re Appeal of [Appellant], F.H. No.
3307248R, at 11–12 (Office of Temp. and Disability Assistance Mar. 29, 2000) (fair
hearing).
208 In re Appeal of Anonymous, F.H. No. 3563886Y, at 3 (Office of Temp. and Disa-
bility Assistance July 18, 2001) (fair hearing).
209 Id.
210 Id. at 4.
211 In re Appeal of C.M., F.H. No. 4286162Z, at 9.
212 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131 (McKinney 2003); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
18, § 351.22(e) (2007); see, e.g., McKillen v. Perales, 519 N.Y.S.2d 59, 60 (App. Div.
1987) (holding that the failure of Social Services to show that the appellant’s failure
to comply with work rules was willful rendered the termination of public assistance
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result as a consequence of willful acts, such acts are generally “un-
related events” and therefore, as such, cannot be said to constitute
willful non-compliance with requirements that are directly related
to participation in the Cash Assistance program.213 Nevertheless,
this Comment’s previous discussion of race, class, and gender dem-
onstrates poignantly that the circumstances leading to arrest and
incarceration entail much more than the deliberate acts of an indi-
vidual. The scope of what constitutes “good cause” must also take
such considerations into account.
B. Other Jurisdictions
Other states have been explicit in their inclusion of incarcera-
tion within the definition of “temporary absence.” For example, in
Nebraska, incarceration is “good cause” for failing to report
changes in income within ten days.214 Nebraska regulations also in-
clude incarceration in the definition of “temporary absence” by al-
lowing an incarcerated parent, caretaker, or guardian to continue
to be the payee for up to three months for allowances that ulti-
mately benefit a dependent child.215 In Oklahoma, the regulations
governing household composition for income consideration ex-
pressly include incarceration as an example of “temporary
absence.”216
In Maine217 and Illinois,218 incarceration is considered “good
cause” for failure to comply with the requirements necessary to
participate in the TANF program—such as attendance at
mandatory meetings. Similarly, incarceration is considered per se
“good cause” to justify failures to comply with participation re-
quirements or absences in Alaska,219 Arizona,220 and Maryland.221
Under the Wisconsin Administrative Code, incarceration has been
benefits improper); Allen v. Blum, 447 N.E. 2d 68, 68 (N.Y. 1983) (reiterating that
willfulness is an element of ineligibility for public assistance, thus, termination of ben-
efits for failure to report to work obligations is permissible only if such failure to
report was willful).
213 In re Appeal of Anonymous, F.H. No. 3563886Y, at 4.
214 468 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 015.02B (West, Westlaw through Mar. 31, 2009).
215 Id. § 006.01D1.
216 OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:40-7-6(c)(B) (West, Westlaw through May 1, 2009).
217 10-144 ME. Code R. § CH. 607(4) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 2009).
218 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 112.80(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 2009).
219 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 45.261(a)(6) (West, Westlaw through Apr. Reg.
189).
220 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R6-12-1306(B)(3) (West, Westlaw through Sept. 30, 2008);
see also John C. v. Sargeant ex rel. County of Maricopa, 90 P.3d 781, 784–85 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding that incarceration can constitute good cause for failure to ap-
pear at a hearing to determine the termination of parental rights); State v. Bail Bonds
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held to satisfy “good cause” in the context of a failure to appear at
a fair hearing.222
Incarceration has also been held as “good cause” for purposes
of other judicial and administrative proceedings in jurisdictions
throughout the United States. For example, in California, although
incarceration does not constitute per se “good cause” in the context
of California Unemployment Insurance (“CUI”), a recipient of
CUI is entitled to have the determination of good cause reheard in
cases where that determination is made prior to any conviction of
the crime that led to the incarceration.223 Likewise, in Florida, it
was held that an employee’s 26-day absence from his employment
due to incarceration was sufficient to satisfy the “good cause” stan-
dard.224 Courts in Indiana,225 Louisiana,226 and Nevada227 have sim-
ilarly each recognized incarceration as “good cause” for
employment absence.
Even in cases where incarceration has been held not to consti-
tute good cause, courts have intimated that an exception would
exist under circumstances where the detention was found to be un-
lawful or where the charges against the detainee were subsequently
dropped. For example, in a recent case in Minnesota, the court
said that incarceration “may provide good cause” depending on
the circumstances of the case.228 Pennsylvania, too, has adhered to
a case-by-case analysis to determine whether a person’s incarcera-
USA, 224 P.3d 210, 214 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the defendant’s continued
detention by the Customs Enforcement Agency constitutes good cause).
221 MD. CODE REGS. 07.03.16.08(D)(8) (West, Westlaw through June 5, 2009).
222 Matousek v. Sears Roebuck & Co., ERD Case No. CR200302571 (Aug. 20, 2004)
(“Obviously, the complainant’s inability to attend the hearing given his involuntary
confinement would satisfy this good cause standard.”); see WIS. ADMIN. CODE DWD
§ 218.18(4) (West, Westlaw through Apr. 15, 2010).
223 See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256.1(b) (West, Westlaw through 2009) (provid-
ing specifically that “good cause” for employment absence may be satisfied where the
individual is not convicted of the offense).
224 Parker v. Dep’t of Labor & Emp’t Sec., 440 So. 2d 438, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); see FLA. STAT. § 443.101(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010).
225 Holmes v. Review Bd. of Indiana Emp’t Sec. Div., 451 N.E.2d 83, 88 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that pre-trial incarceration constitutes “good cause” for employ-
ment absence and, therefore, unemployment benefits cannot be denied on such
grounds); see IND. CODE § 22-4-15-1(d)(3) (current as of 2010).
226 Schoennagel v. Louisiana Office of Emp’t Sec., 413 So. 2d 652, 654–55 (La.
1982) (holding that by being incarcerated the employee did not “voluntarily” leave
his employment and, therefore, had good cause for his absence and could not be
disqualified from receiving benefits).
227 State, Emp’t Sec. Dep’t v. Evans, 901 P.2d 156, 156–57 (Nev. 1995) (explaining
that where an employee could not afford to post bail, her “absence [from work] was
neither deliberate nor voluntary”).
228 See Petracek v. Univ. of Minnesota, 780 N.W.2d 927, 930 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
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tion can constitute good cause.229
The practice at the New York City Human Resources Adminis-
tration departs from each of the various systems in place in other
states around the country. HRA has decided to implement its dis-
criminatory policy notwithstanding the heightened financial bur-
den it imposes on a tight City budget and on everyday New Yorkers
struggling through the current financial crisis. Furthermore, the
exclusion of incarceration from the temporary absence policy has
been imposed despite readily available data from the City of New
York Department of Correction and HRA’s own reports that those
who will be affected are New York most susceptible populations of
poor individuals and families of color.230
Based on the often transient and temporary nature of incar-
ceration periods that nonetheless render Cash Assistance recipi-
ents at risk of benefit termination under the current policy, and
consistent with findings in other jurisdictions, incarceration should
be considered “good cause” that falls within the definition of “tem-
porary absence” under § 349.4 of the NYCRR.
V. A REMEDY TO PROMOTE SECURITY AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY
The remedy for this disconnect between the temporary ab-
sence policy as it is written in the state regulations and the resul-
tant effects of its improper application by HRA in practice is
neither complex nor controversial. Simply put, incarceration
should be treated no differently than any other type of circum-
stance that falls within the scope of “temporary absence.” Rather
than create a special standard for how incarceration should be in-
terpreted within the context of Cash Assistance, HRA should use
the same criteria as those used to make temporary absence deter-
minations for other situations. As previously stated, under the gen-
eral temporary absence standard, the grant of Cash Assistance may
be continued as long as the participant is “reasonably expected”231
to return to the home based on evidence that he or she “(i) does
not leave the United States; (ii) does not evidence intent to estab-
lish residence elsewhere; and (iii) complies with [§ 349.4] and
other provisions of [Title 18 of the NYCRR].”232
229 Thomas v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 543 A.2d 600, 602 (Pa.
1988) (restating a previous holding that while incarceration is not per se “good cause,”
it may constitute good cause where constitutional rights are implicated).
230 See City of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 66; HRA FACTS QUARTERLY, supra note
4.
231 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a) (2007).
232 Id.
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By restoring the definition of temporary absence to include
incarceration, families will be able to retain the funds necessary for
mandatory monthly household expenses, such as rent, that would
otherwise be reduced when the household’s Cash Assistance enti-
tlement is rebudgeted to include one less person.233 As previously
mentioned, other situations of temporary absences by the recipient
allow for the continued disbursement of payments for up to 180
days, contingent on a review by a caseworker after 45 days to deter-
mine that the absence is indeed temporary and that the individual
intends to return to the household.234 Likewise, standards for the
continuance of benefits despite a temporary absence have re-
mained flexible when the recipient is able to show “good cause”235
or when it is “essential to retain housing and maintain the
home.”236
It was also noted above that incarceration establishes “good
cause” for non-compliance with many agency requirements such as
the requirement to work.237 HRA already demonstrates a willing-
ness to remain flexible in light of exceptional circumstances, as evi-
denced by the current practice that allows over 50% of recipients
to continue receiving CA for circumstances like residential treat-
ment for substance abuse, a child’s placement in foster care, or
admission to a medical facility, among others.238 It would be no less
feasible to apply such waiver practices to individuals who are tem-
porarily incarcerated. Since any continuance of Cash Assistance
can be managed and monitored for cases involving incarceration
just as it is for other “good causes” of temporary absence, there is
no compelling justification for evaluating temporary incarceration
differently than other temporary absences.
There are structural controls in place to regulate the disburse-
ment of Cash Assistance and to ensure that only eligible individuals
and families are receiving assistance.239 For other temporary ab-
sence cases, payments cannot continue for more than 45 days un-
less a caseworker has reviewed the Cash Assistance recipient’s
status and it is expected that he or she will not remain in the facil-
ity for more than 180 days.240 This permits HRA and OTDA to al-
233 See Temporary Assistance Source Book, supra note 36.
234 Id.
235 See id. at 206.
236 PD No. 02-35-ELI and PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18.
237 N.Y.C. HUMAN RES. ADMIN., supra note 75, at lines 3, 15.
238 Id.
239 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a)(2)(i), (ii), (iii) (2007).
240 Id.
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low for CA to continue for up to six months if it is “essential to
retain housing and maintain the home” while keeping the objec-
tive of family stability at the forefront of the policy.241 To further
control and sustain structure in the system, when the recipient is
absent for more than six months, HRA and OTDA have required
the recipient to submit affirmative evidence of his or her contin-
ued intent to return to the home and that he or she is prevented
from returning because of “illness or other good cause.”242 Given
these standards to maintain the integrity of the program, and
ongoing assurance that the requisite conditions that establish a
temporary absence are met, there need not be concern that the
inclusion of incarceration in the definition of “temporary absence”
would lead to fraudulent or unnecessary disbursement of CA
funds. Thus, it follows that—consistent with goals of social and eco-
nomic stability—incarceration should be evaluated in the same
manner as all other temporary absence claims.
CONCLUSION
The creation of an improper limitation on the continuance of
Cash Assistance to individuals who have been temporarily incarcer-
ated is in conflict with an unambiguous state regulation and the
purpose of public benefit policies “to achieve the maximum level
of self-sufficiency.”243 Such a limitation has resulted in the unin-
tended consequences of decreased stability for families, homeless-
ness, and increased costs for both the City and State. Evaluating
situations where a member of a household is incarcerated in the
same way that other “temporary absence” situations are evaluated
promotes a system that is reliable, stable, effective and true to its
objectives. Where stability, family cohesiveness and self-sufficiently
are the desired results of Cash Assistance, there is no defensible
justification for excluding incarceration—an exclusion that ulti-
mately prevents families from achieving either. Such an exclusion
is even less justified in light of considerable and continuous data
that demonstrate the disproportionate rates of arrest and deten-
tion faced by poor people of color in New York.244 Since it would
be in the best interests of families and consistent with the intent of
HRA, OTDA, the New York State and United States legislatures as
241 See PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18; N.Y.C. HUMAN RES. ADMIN., supra note 5.
242 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.4(a)(2)(i).
243 N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., supra note 5; see N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 131(1) (Mc-
Kinney 2003); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., supra note 5.
244 See supra Part III.B.
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well as with the abovementioned statistical and public policy sup-
port, incarceration should be evaluated no differently than any
other temporary absence situation.
The regulation establishes that “temporary absence” is satis-
fied by “any absence . . . during which the person (i) does not leave
the United States; (ii) does not evidence intent to establish resi-
dence elsewhere; and (iii) complies with [§ 349.4] and other provi-
sions of [Title 18 of the NYCRR].”245 Nothing more is required to
demonstrate that a period of incarceration can fall squarely within
this regulatory mandate. Notwithstanding the clear regulatory
mandate, the need to reconsider the current restrictive application
of the temporary absence policy is further supported by ample so-
cial and public policy justifications.246 Therefore, to the extent that
individuals in situations of temporary incarceration meet the re-
quired statutory and regulatory criteria for their absences to be
considered “temporary,” incarceration should be interpreted to be
within the scope of the definition of “temporary absence” as man-
dated by the New York State legislature.247
245 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.  tit. 18, § 349.4(a) (emphasis added); see also PD
No. 02-35-ELI; PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra note 18 (“Temporarily absent individuals are
budgeted as if they are physically in the household and are eligible for the basic allow-
ance plus energy, shelter, fuel and any other additional allowances.”).
246 See discussion supra Part I, II.
247 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 349.4(a); contra PD No. 08-16-ELI, supra
note 18.
